Add to ORKGThis paper reports on the behavior of experimental markets wherein buyers were ignorant (unless truthfully informed by sellers) of the quality of the product purchased. True quality of the product was learned only after the sale. Sellers chose quality or "grade" and higher quality was more costly to produce. Our experimental markets were characterised by asymmetric information possessed by buyers and sellers who traded a pure "experience" good whose quality was endogenously determined
We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market fo...
Lemon markets occur in situations when prior to purchase buyers are unable to observe the product an...
In G. A. Akerlof's market for lemons, goods of differential qualities sell under the same standard. ...
Experiments indicated that if sellers could not develop reputations for poor quality, then the marke...
This study reports on the behavior of experimental markets in which product quality is endogenously...
It is shown that the presence of informed buyers is necessary but not always sufficient for producer...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
In a series of eleven markets, sellers possessed products that were exogenously designated as eithe...
We consider a market-for-lemons model where the seller is a price setter, and, in addition to observ...
This paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attenti...
In markets for many fruits, vegetables, and an increasing number of imported goods, consumers cannot...
We extend Akerlof ’s (1970) “Market for Lemons” by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buye...
This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets. More p...
Survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher p...
AbstractIn this work we study an agent based model to investigate the role of asymmetric information...
We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market fo...
Lemon markets occur in situations when prior to purchase buyers are unable to observe the product an...
In G. A. Akerlof's market for lemons, goods of differential qualities sell under the same standard. ...
Experiments indicated that if sellers could not develop reputations for poor quality, then the marke...
This study reports on the behavior of experimental markets in which product quality is endogenously...
It is shown that the presence of informed buyers is necessary but not always sufficient for producer...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
In a series of eleven markets, sellers possessed products that were exogenously designated as eithe...
We consider a market-for-lemons model where the seller is a price setter, and, in addition to observ...
This paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attenti...
In markets for many fruits, vegetables, and an increasing number of imported goods, consumers cannot...
We extend Akerlof ’s (1970) “Market for Lemons” by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buye...
This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets. More p...
Survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher p...
AbstractIn this work we study an agent based model to investigate the role of asymmetric information...
We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market fo...
Lemon markets occur in situations when prior to purchase buyers are unable to observe the product an...
In G. A. Akerlof's market for lemons, goods of differential qualities sell under the same standard. ...